Blame the Victim, Inc.

William BernsteinThe views presented here do not necessarily represent those of Advisor Perspectives.

Thirty years ago, I had a front-row seat for the dawn of the opioid epidemic, as ever more patients taking large amounts of OxyContin for chronic spine pain began showing up in my neurology practice.

The source of this alarming phenomenon was obvious: the legion of well-dressed, attractive young Purdue Pharma representatives flooding the waiting rooms of my family practice colleagues, whom the company had identified as the target “franchise” of its marketing campaign, a strategy the company had pioneered.

Why family doctors, and not the specialists — orthopedists, neurologists, neurosurgeons, and anesthesiologists — who most frequently treat such patients? Because these four specialties, by both training and experience, were aware of the often deadly dangers of prescribing chronic narcotics for patients with non-malignant pain syndromes, and whose practitioners greeted with disbelief the Purdue representatives’ assurances that only one percent of such patients would become addicted.

In the following quarter century, over 800,000 Americans would die of narcotic overdose, at first from OxyContin itself, then from illicit narcotics — especially fentanyl — sought by OxyContin users after the FDA forced the company to reformulate the drug to be less addictive.

Purdue blamed the victims; said Richard Sackler, the company’s head, “We have to hammer the abusers . . . They are the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals.”

A Problem of Framing

In It’s on You: How Corporations and Behavioral Scientists Have Convinced Us That We're to Blame for Society's Deepest Problems, behavioralists Nick Chater and George Loewenstein, characterize Sackler’s outrageous moral dodge as a classic “i-frame/s-frame1 sleight of hand. Here, a patent failure of the system (s-frame: in this case, negligent FDA oversight) is spun by the perpetrators as a failure of individuals (i-frame: in this case, the patients Purdue had addicted).

As the authors point out, the i-frame seeks behavioral change within an unquestioned, fixed s-frame. Alas, while system change can be challenging, human nature change proves yet more difficult. Though gimmicky i-frame interventions often initially generate enthusiasm, their long-run benefits usually disappoint.

And while it’s easy to blame corporate villains like Sackler, Chater and Loewenstein caution the reader to avoid the “fundamental attribution error”: the assignment of primary causation to the evil nature of individual actors, and not to the environmental forces that motivate them. Yes, Sackler was a bad actor, but he was driven by a combination of economic imperatives and absence of regulatory brakes that made the opioid epidemic all but inevitable. Had he not orchestrated it, then someone else would have, due to how the system was set up.

It’s curious that the authors did not cite Arendt’s “banality of evil.” Assessed individually, the overwhelming majority of the Auschwitz staff were little different from today’s corporate participants who, in pursuit of their company’s goals, convince each other that they are doing God’s work. In the case of Purdue Pharma, alleviating pain was the goal, and in the case of Auschwitz, it was ridding humanity of “vermin.”